University of Baltimore Law

ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law
All Faculty Scholarship

Faculty Scholarship

2013

The Dialectic of Stare Decisis Doctrine
Colin Starger
University of Baltimore School of Law, cstarger@ubalt.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/all_fac
Part of the Legal History Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States Commons
Recommended Citation
The Dialectic of Stare Decisis Doctrine, in Precedent in the United States Supreme Court (Christopher J. Peters, ed., 2013)

This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in All Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For
more information, please contact snolan@ubalt.edu.

University of Baltimore
Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2013-18

The Dialectic of Stare Decisis Doctrine

Colin P. Starger
University of Baltimore Law School

The Dialectic of Stare Decisis Doctrine
Colin Starger – 4/15/13
In the United States Supreme Court, the concept of stare decisis operates as both
metadoctrine and doctrine. On the one hand, stare decisis functions as a generally applicable
presumption in favor of adherence to precedent. This presumption is metadoctrinal because it
provides a generic argument against overruling that applies independently of the substantive
context of any given case. On the other hand, when the Court considers overruling a particularly
controversial precedent, it usually weighs the constraining force of stare decisis by invoking
factors and tests announced in its own prior caselaw. In other words, the Court has precedent
about when to follow its precedent. This “precedent about precedent” seems doctrinal in the
conventional sense – it is the Court’s doctrine of stare decisis.
The existence of a stand-alone stare decisis doctrine in the Supreme Court was hardly
inevitable. The Constitution does not mention precedent at all and thus provides no textual
guidance about when stare decisis should be respected. Perhaps predictably, the Court
historically decided overruling questions on a case-by-case basis without any reference to
“precedent about precedent.” Prior to the early twentieth century, if Court opinions discussed
stare decisis at all, they typically referred to the concept as a “maxim” or “principle” that
abstractly weighed in favor of following past decisions. 1 Though the maxim commanded respect,
its authority and meaning were derived from common law tradition rather than from prior Court
pronouncements.
Not so today. Consider the Court’s controversial 2010 Citizens United decision. 2 In
Citizens United, a sharply divided Court struck down a federal law barring certain corporate
electioneering expenditures on the grounds that the law violated the First Amendment. While
most remember Citizens United as opening the door to unlimited political spending by “super
PACs,” the case also featured a fierce debate about the majority’s overruling of two existing First
Amendment cases. 3 Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy cited the Court’s 2009 decision in
Montejo v. Louisiana for the proposition that the “relevant factors in deciding whether to adhere
to the principle of stare decisis include the antiquity of the precedent, the reliance interests at
stake, and [ ] whether the decision was well reasoned.” 4 In dissent, Justice Stevens countered that
whether a precedent was “well reasoned” was a “merits argument” not entitled to “weight in the
stare decisis calculus.” 5 Quoting 1992’s Planned Parenthood v. Casey, Stevens insisted that “[a]

1

See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Coxe, 4 U.S. 170, 192 (1800) (argument of counsel) (“Stare decisis [] is a maxim to be
held forever sacred [] on questions of property.”); Cook v. Moffat, 46 U.S. 295, 309 (“So far [] as the present case is
concerned, the court do not think it necessary or prudent to depart from the safe maxim of stare decisis.”); Bienville
Water Supply Co. v. City of Mobile, 186 U.S. 212, 217 (1902) (“[W]e may, on the principle of stare decisis,
rightfully examine and consider the decision in the former case as affecting the consideration of this.”).
2
Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 130 S.Ct. 876 (2010).
3
See Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 913 (overruling Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652
(1990)); id. (overruling McConnell v. Federal Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003)).
4
Id. at 912 (quoting Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S.Ct. 2079, 2088-89 (2009)).
5
Id. at 939 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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decision to overrule should rest on some special reason above and beyond the belief that a prior
case was wrongly decided.” 6
Critically, this argument between Kennedy and Stevens in Citizens United assumed a
doctrinal form. The authority of Montejo was pitted against that of Casey to support conflicting
positions on whether stare decisis requires adherence to precedent despite disagreement with
prior reasoning. As it happens, the cited opinions in Montejo and Casey themselves cite back to
different earlier cases to support their competing interpretations about the appropriate test for
overruling precedent. The clash in Citizens United over stare decisis thus reflects an ongoing
dialectic in Court discourse that is distinct from any First Amendment controversy. Instead of a
generic maxim associated with common-law tradition, the concept of stare decisis appears to
have become a contested doctrine.
How did this happen? How did stare decisis transform from a common law maxim into a
doctrinal dialectic? The goal of this Chapter is to answer this essentially historical question and
then analyze its implications for our current understanding of precedent on the Unites States
Supreme Court. After undertaking a historical analysis that charts the evolution of stare decisis
on the Court from maxim to contested doctrine, the Chapter seeks to shed light on how much
stare decisis doctrine actually constrains decision-making or affects outcomes in directly
substantive territories of the Court’s constitutional and statutory jurisprudence. Put another way,
this Chapter maps the dialectic of stare decisis doctrine in order to assess whether the Court’s
“precedent about precedent” has any genuine precedential value.
The Chapter proceeds in three parts.
Part I begins the inquiry by reviewing the early era of the Court’s precedent
jurisprudence, which extends from the Founding up until Justice Brandeis’ landmark dissent in
1932’s Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co. 7 This part shows how, prior to Brandeis’ dissent,
abstract stare decisis discussions played almost no doctrinal or analytical role in Court debates
about overruling precedent. However, Brandeis forever changed this discourse. His Coronado
Oil dissent catalogued the Court’s actual overruling practices in such a powerful manner that his
attendant stare decisis analysis immediately assumed canonical authority. Overruling debates
after Brandeis appealed to Court doctrine on stare decisis.
Part II analyzes the evolution of Court discourse from Coronado Oil until Citizens
United. Through the use of graphical “opinion maps,” this part illustrates how modern stare
decisis doctrine became a dialectic. The dialectic pits competing lines of opinions against each
other. The competing opinion lines diverge on whether stare decisis requires adherence to
precedent in face of disagreement with prior reasoning. Although both lines ultimately trace back
to Brandeis’ Coronado Oil dissent, this part demonstrates how the contemporary conflict
emerged from a key debate between Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thurgood Marshall in
1991’s Payne v. Tennessee. The Payne debate serves as the blueprint for the Court’s modern
dialectic of stare decisis doctrine.
6
7

Id. at 938 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 864 (1992)).
Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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With the history mapped out, Part III takes a critical look at the competing claims in the
contemporary stare decisis dialectic. By analyzing the arguments pressed by both sides in
context, this final part considers whether the Court’s stare decisis doctrine has any genuine
precedential value. It concludes that even though the doctrine’s actual constraint on Supreme
Court decision-making is minimal, it retains real political and rhetorical significance.
I – Early Era Stare Decisis Jurisprudence and the Impact of Brandeis
Article III of the Constitution vests the “judicial Power of the United States” in the
Supreme Court and in inferior courts established by Congress. Beyond describing the subjects of
the power’s jurisdiction, Article III does not articulate principles governing the proper exercise
of this judicial power. Similarly, though Article VI establishes the Constitution as the supreme
law of the land, and though various Amendments guarantee important substantive and procedural
rights, no constitutional provision explains how to interpret or apply this supreme law and its
guaranteed rights. The Constitution, in short, provides no rules of judicial adjudication.
The absence of constitutionally mandated adjudicatory rules never posed a problem for
the Supreme Court. From the start, the Court was able to go about interpreting the Constitution
without difficulty. This is because the Constitution did not displace all the law that came before
it – the new republic inherited the common law and its associated traditions. Just as common law
doctrines regarding property and contract persisted, so too continued common law traditions
governing interpretation of doctrine.
Of course, the Court never formally announced all the adjudicatory rules or metadoctrinal
principles it adopted from the common law. Rather, the rules and principles guiding Court
deliberations were organically revealed in its published opinions starting in 1791. Careful
analysis of these opinions indicates that the common law maxim stare decisis et non quieta
movere (“to stand by things decided, and not to disturb settled points”) played a role in Court
adjudication from the founding. However, this analysis also shows that early era stare decisis
discourse differed significantly from modern stare decisis doctrine.
For purposes of this inquiry, the early era of the Court’s stare decisis jurisprudence
extends from 1791 until 1916. The era begins in the year the Court issued its first written opinion
and ends when Louis Brandeis became an Associate Justice. 8 During this 125-year period, the
phrase “stare decisis” appears in only 40 published decisions. 9 Looking closer, stare decisis was
invoked in 22 majority opinions, 15 dissenting opinions, one concurring opinion and five
reported arguments of counsel. 10 The vast majority of early these stare decisis references
involved no analysis of the concept. Instead, invocation of the maxim usually served a simple
8

See West v. Barnes, 2 U.S. 401 (1791) (first published opinion by the Court); Hutchinson Ice Cream Co. v. Iowa,
242 U.S. 153 (1916) (first Brandeis opinion for the Court).
9
This number is based on a simple keyword search for “stare decisis” in Westlaw’s comprehensive Supreme Court
database. This search produces 45 separate decisions published before 1916. However, I eliminated five of these
decisions because the phrase did not appear in an actual opinion or summary of counsel’s argument.
10
These numbers are based upon an examination of the decisions discussed in supra note 9. Although modern
Supreme Court reports do not separately summarize the arguments of counsel, this practice is evident in early era
reporting as late as 1870. See Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. 457, 459-528 (1870) (69 pages devoted to reporting
arguments of counsel).
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rhetorical function in arguments about following precedent. A brief survey of these early
decisions uncovers the typical usage.
The very first reported reference to stare decisis in the United States Reports is actually
both typical and atypical. In 1800’s Pennsylvania v. Coxe, the Court considered an action
seeking to force the Secretary of the Land Office to issue patents to the Holland Company for
lands that had been warranted to the company by act of the Pennsylvania General Assembly. 11 In
his argument, counsel for the Holland Company stated: “Stare decisis, is a maxim to be held
forever sacred, on questions of property; and, in the present instance, applies with particular
force, as the rule was given by the state herself, through the medium of her officers.” 12
This reference is typical in its use of stare decisis to support a generic appeal to follow
existing law and also in its suggestion that precedent applies with special force on questions of
property. However, the reference is atypical because it urges adherence to a non-Supreme Court
precedent (an act of the Pennsylvania legislature). Early-era appeals to stare decisis normally
concerned fidelity to Court precedent alone. Stare decisis is not usually understood to require the
Court to follow law set down by inferior or foreign courts, much less by a state legislature.
Although the earliest references to stare decisis in the United States Reports surfaced in
arguments of counsel, the concept soon found rhetorical use in majority and dissenting opinions
alike. Thus, in 1831’s Ex Parte Crane, Justice Baldwin dissented from the majority’s conclusion
that the Supreme Court had a previously unrecognized mandamus power. 13 After surveying the
“embryo system of American jurisprudence,” Baldwin concluded that “this court is called on to
assert a power, which in the forty-two years of its existence it has never exercised” and so
announced “I must follow my own judgment, and dissent in the threshold: obsta principiis stare
decisis.” 14
Where Baldwin deployed stare decisis to summarize his argument about absence of
precedent, others used the phrase to summarily justify fidelity to existing precedent. 1847’s Cook
v. Moffat supplies a representative example. In that case, the Court affirmed a line of cases
regarding discharge of contracts under state insolvent laws. 15 Justice Grier concluded his
majority opinion by observing “in order to meet the views of the learned counsel for the plaintiff
in error, we should be compelled to overrule every case heretofore decided… [but] the court do
not think it necessary or prudent to depart from the safe maxim of stare decisis.” 16
Not all early-era discussions of stare decisis advocated following the maxim in such a
conclusory fashion. Indeed, some opinions that argued for overruling precedent featured more
extensive analysis about the Court’s obligation to its own prior decisions. The oldest exemplar of
this genre is Chief Justice Taney’s majority opinion 1850’s The Genesee Chief. The case held
that federal admiralty jurisdiction extended to certain navigable lakes and rivers, which
11

See Pennsylvania v. Coxe, 4 U.S. 170 (1800).
Id. at 192.
13
See generally Ex Parte Crane, 30 U.S. 190 (1831).
14
See id. at 221, 222 (Baldwin, J., dissenting).
15
Cook v. Moffat, 46 U.S. 295 (1847).
16
Id. at 309.
12
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effectively overruled an 1825 decision called The Thomas Jefferson. 17 Acknowledging this
change in the law, Taney first explained that The Thomas Jefferson “did not decide any question
of property, or lay down any rule by which the right of property should be determined.” 18 He
then argued that when Court precedent concerns property rights, “stare decisis is the safe and
established rule of judicial policy, and should always be adhered to.” 19 However, since The
Thomas Jefferson concerned jurisdiction only, and “as we are convinced that the former decision
was founded in error [that will] produce serious public as well as private inconvenience and
loss,” Taney concluded the case could be overruled. 20
Chief Justice Taney’s suggestion that stare decisis had less force on jurisdictional
questions was implicitly contested in a fascinating case decided just three years later –1853’s
Marshall v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. 21 The plaintiff in the case, a shady character named Marshall,
had allegedly contracted with the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company to peddle influence in
the Virginia legislature in order to obtain passage of a law favorable to the corporation. The law
passed, but the corporation refused to pay. Marshall then audaciously sued the railway company
in federal court. After losing below, Marshall appealed to the Supreme Court, where he faced
numerous objections – including to the very existence of federal diversity jurisdiction. 22
Marshall, a citizen of Virginia, claimed diversity existed because the corporation was a “citizen”
of Maryland.
On the jurisdictional question, the Court held for Marshall. Citing Louisville Railroad v.
Letson, an 1844 decision that recognized corporate citizenship for diversity purposes, Justice
Grier’s majority opinion explained:
[Letson] has, for the space of ten years, been received by the bar as a final
settlement of the [jurisdictional] questions which have so frequently arisen under
this clause of the Constitution… There are no cases, where an adherence to the
maxim of “stare decisis” is so absolutely necessary to the peace of society, as
those which affect retroactively the jurisdiction of the courts, for this reason
alone, even if the court were now of the opinion that the principles affirmed in the
case… were not founded on right reason, we should not be justified in overruling
them. 23
Here Grier articulated a very robust vision of stare decisis. He insisted that ten years of reliance
on Letson rendered the correctness of the precedent’s reasoning wholly irrelevant, effectively
insulating the decision from overruling.
Although the majority ultimately ruled against Marshall – holding his contract void on
public policy grounds – Grier’s jurisdictional and stare decisis analyses did not go unchallenged.
17

See The Genesee Chief, 53 U.S. 443, 458-59 (1851) (overruling The Thomas Jefferson, 23 U.S. 428 (1825)).
Id. at 458.
19
Id.
20
Id. at 459.
21
Marshall v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 57 U.S. 314 (1853).
22
Diversity jurisdiction refers to federal courts’ exercise of authority over cases involving parties who are citizens of
different states and an amount in controversy greater than a statutory minimum. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
23
Id. at 325-26 (citing Louisville, C. & C. R. Co. v. Letson, 43 U.S. 497 (1844)) (emphasis added).
18
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Indeed, Justice Daniel vociferously dissented. Refusing to comment on “the settlement of the
discreditable controversy,” Daniel wryly suggested that the parties “settle their dispute by some
standard which is cognate to the transaction in which they have been engaged.” 24 He then
frontally attacked the Court doctrine that recognized corporations as citizens. After detailing his
critique, Daniel expressed his incredulity at the majority’s appeal to stare decisis. He argued that
the doctrine creating “this new class of citizen corporations” was “strictly a new creation, an
alien and an intruder” that could “trace its being no farther back than [Letson].” 25 Daniel then
opined:
[Stare decisis] is doubtless a wholesome rule of decision when derived from
legitimate and competent authority… but, like every other rule, must be fruitful of
ill when it shall be wrested to the suppression of reason or duty, or to the arbitrary
maintenance of injustice, of palpable error, or of absurdity. 26
Seeing Letson’s doctrine as absurd, unjust, and devoid of constitutional reason, Daniel argued the
precedent should not be saved by the rule of stare decisis. By appealing to the soundness of a
precedent’s reasoning in overruling decisions, Daniel thus voiced a weak view of stare decisis.
The debate in Marshall between Justices Grier and Daniel marks the first time in
Supreme Court discourse that majority and dissent explicitly clashed over the interpretation and
application of stare decisis. Remarkably enough, this conflict over the rights of corporations and
role of stare decisis preceded Citizens United by 157 years. Just as in Citizens United, the
competing justices in Marshall staked out opposite positions on whether stare decisis requires
adherence to precedent despite disagreement with prior reasoning. However, unlike Kennedy and
Stevens in Citizens United, neither Grier nor Daniel appealed to prior Court precedent to support
his view of stare decisis. This failure to cite stare decisis precedent seems a real missed
opportunity for Justice Daniel in particular. Recalling Chief Justice Taney’s analysis explored
above, Daniel could have invoked The Genesee Chief for the proposition that Court precedents
about jurisdiction have little stare decisis value. Invoking The Genesee Chief might well have
given Daniel’s argument in favor of overruling Letson more authority. 27
Of course, hindsight is always twenty-twenty. Critiquing Daniel’s failure to cite The
Genesee Chief now is probably unfair given the discursive norms of the time. Indeed, out of the
40 published opinions referencing stare decisis in the early era, only one relied on prior authority
to justify an abstract argument about overruling precedent. This single exception to the rule –
Justice White’s dissent in 1903’s Kean v. Calumet Canal & Improvement Co. – is thus entirely
unrepresentative of the early era. 28 Far more representative are the opinions discussed and
analyzed above – Pennsylvania v. Coxe, Ex Parte Crane, The Genesee Chief and Marshall v.
24

Id. at 338 (Daniel, J., dissenting).
Id. at 343.
26
Id.
27
Of course, Grier might have responded that The Genesee Chief concerned the expansion of federal jurisdiction
rather than contraction. The merits of this distinction are irrelevant; the point is that Grier and Daniel did not debate
it.
28
See Kean v. Calumet Canal &Improvement Co., 190 U.S. 452, 505-07 (1903) (White, J., dissenting). Compared to
Brandeis’ subsequent use of “precedent about precedent,” Justice White’s argument for overruling was neither
successful nor influential in Court discourse.
25
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Baltimore & O. R. Co. Whether these cases mentioned stare decisis briefly or discussed the
concept in some detail, these cases all show that stare decisis was originally understood as a
common-law maxim rather than the subject of Court doctrine. Prior to twentieth century,
Supreme Court justices simply did not frame arguments about the propriety of overruling
precedent by reference to prior Court decisions.
Louis Brandeis changed all that.
In a series of dissenting opinions culminating in 1932’s Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas
Co., Justice Brandeis developed an analysis of stare decisis based upon a rigorous empirical
study of the Court’s actual overruling practices. Brandeis so carefully mined and categorized the
Court’s own “precedent about precedent” in his opinions that his attendant framework for the
proper application of stare decisis itself assumed canonical authority. In both content and form,
Brandeis’ Coronado Oil dissent established new discursive standards that effectively gave birth
to the Court’s modern stare decisis doctrine. Given its importance to the Court’s current
jurisprudence, a careful reading of Coronado Oil is in order.
The substantive context giving rise to Brandeis’ famous dissent concerned the federal
government’s attempts to levy taxes against the Coronado Oil & Gas Company. This private
corporation derived all of its income from oil fields that it leased from the State of Oklahoma; it
claimed exemption from federal income taxation on the theory its lease made it an
instrumentality of the State. Five justices agreed with the corporation. In his opinion for
majority, Justice McReynolds singled out a 1922 precedent called Gillespie v. Oklahoma and
argued that “the present claim of exemption cannot be distinguished from the one presented in
[Gillespie].”29 Because the “opinion in Gillespie [] has often been referred to as the expression of
an accepted principle,” McReynolds concluded that “we adhere to the rule there approved.” 30
Though he did not use the phrase, McReynolds clearly took refuge in the principle of stare
decisis.
In dissent, Justice Brandeis minced no words starting with his opening lines: “Under the
rule of Gillespie [], vast private incomes are being given immunity from state and federal
taxation… that case was wrongly decided and should now be frankly overruled.” 31 From this
direct framing of the issue, Brandeis launched immediately into his stare decisis analysis. His
first sentence is oft-repeated: “Stare decisis is not, like the rule of res judicata, a universal
inexorable command.” 32 Brandeis then concisely articulated the general arguments for and
against the application of stare decisis. He began:
Stare decisis is usually the wise policy, because in most matters it is more
important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right…
29

Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393,398 (1932) (citing Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U.S. 501 (1922)).
Id. at 399-400, 398.
31
Id. at 405 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
32
Id. Res judicata (“a thing adjudicated”) refers to the doctrine otherwise known as “claim preclusion,” which bars
the same parties from litigating a second lawsuit on the same claim. Brandeis actually cribbed his “universal
inexorable command” phrase from a dissent he had penned eight years earlier. Compare Washington v. W.C.
Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219, 238 (1924) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Like any sensible and productive writer,
Brandeis borrowed freely from his own prior work.
30
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This is commonly true even where the error is a matter of serious concern,
provided correction can be had by legislation. 33
According to Brandeis then, stability in the law is the overriding justification for the presumption
in favor of following precedent. He sees stability in judicial decision-making as so critical that
the burden to correct “bad” precedents should ordinarily fall on legislatures. However, that is not
the whole story:
But in cases involving the Federal Constitution, where correction through
legislative action is practically impossible, this court has often overruled its earlier
decisions. The court bows to the lessons of experience and the force of better
reasoning, recognizing that the process of trial and error, so fruitful in the physical
sciences, is appropriate also in the judicial function. 34
Per Brandeis, the effectively unreviewable nature of the Court’s constitutional decision-making
demands an exception to the general presumption in favor of stare decisis. He therefore
concludes that the Court should not hesitate to overrule precedents that contradict experience or
good reason.
While sharp and succinctly put, Brandeis’ abstract analysis is not what gives the opinion
its real rhetorical force. Rather, his footnotes are what jump off the page and seize the reader’s
attention. Brandeis drops three footnotes in the short paragraph just quoted – and those notes
occupy two full pages of the United States Reports. The first footnote follows the sentence
suggesting that stare decisis is especially wise policy when Court “error[s]” can be corrected by
legislation. Dryly observing that the Court has “occasionally overruled its earlier decisions
although correction might have been secured by legislation,” this footnote catalogs over a dozen
non-Constitutional precedents and the subsequent cases that overruled them. 35 The second
footnote lists nearly thirty overruled or abrogated Constitutional precedents as well as the cases
that effected the change. 36 The third footnote features quotes from Chief Justice Taney as well as
Justices Miller and Field that all approve of reviewing precedent in light of forceful reasoning or
the test of experience. 37
Cumulatively, these footnotes demonstrated to an empirical certainty that the Court had
historically treated stare decisis as a discretionary principle. Brandeis cited authority en masse to
prove that overruling was a realistic option and one frequently taken by the Court. Having
established these general premises, Brandeis then brought home his specific argument for
overruling Gillespie. Adherence to stare decisis is not advisable, he argued, when the challenged
precedent was based on factual determinations “influenced by prevailing views as to economic
or social policy which have since been abandoned.” 38 Gillespie suffered from this flaw since it
33

Id. at 406. Brandeis lifted the “more important that a rule of law be settled, than that it be settled right” from a
dissent he wrote five years earlier. Compare DiSanto v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 42 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
34
Id. at 406-08.
35
Id. at 406, n. 1.
36
Id. at 407, n. 2.
37
Id. at 408, n. 3.
38
Id. at 410, 412.
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rested on an essentially factual judgment that taxing a private company’s lease profits would
“interfere substantially with the functions of state government.” 39 Given that better reasoning
suggested that Gillespie was wrong about this, Brandeis concluded the case should be overruled.
History shows that Brandeis’ argument succeeded brilliantly. On the federal income tax
question, the Court did indeed frankly overrule Gillespie six short years after the Coronado Oil
majority declined to do so. 40 More than this, Brandeis’s influence over the Court’s stare decisis
jurisprudence was profound. Thus, in three separate opinions written between 1936 and 1944,
Justice (and then Chief Justice) Stone specifically cited to Brandeis’ Coronado Oil dissent and its
extraordinary footnotes to support propositions about the Court’s ability to overrule its
constitutional precedents. 41 By 1949, Justice Rutledge had similarly referred to “the trenchant
discussion by Mr. Justice Brandeis of the lesser impact of stare decisis in the realm of
constitutional construction” and highlighted “the instances in which this court has overruled prior
constitutional determinations [] catalogued in [Coronado Oil].”42 Brandeis’ dissent soon
assumed canonical authority.
Brandeis dramatically impacted both the substance and form of the Court’s stare decisis
jurisprudence. Substantively, Brandeis’ analysis about the proper conditions for adhering to
precedent still resonates. Justices to this day quote or paraphrase his most famous aphorisms –
like “stare decisis is not an inexorable command” or “it is more important that the law be settled
than that it be settled right.” Formally, Brandeis made it de rigueur for justices to cite Court
authority when discussing stare decisis. After Coronado Oil, no Court opinion has ever again
described stare decisis as a maxim. Abstract debates about overruling precedent instead proceed
by reference to the Court’s own prior pronouncements on the topic. In short, stare decisis
transformed from common-law maxim to Supreme Court doctrine.
II – Mapping the Dialectic of Stare Decisis Doctrine
Contemporary stare decisis doctrine may owe its existence to Brandeis, but it also
exhibits a dialectical form. As demonstrated by the debate in Citizens United, the discourse now
has two distinct tests for when the Court can rightly overrule its own precedents. The first test
advocates what I call a “weak” conception of stare decisis that sanctions overruling if a
challenged precedent suffers from “bad reasoning.” The second test promotes what I call a
“strong” version of stare decisis – one that requires a “special justification” for overruling
beyond mere belief that the challenged precedent was “wrongly decided.” Given the existence of
two competing stare decisis tests, it seems unlikely that Coronado Oil alone – a single source –
gave rise to contemporary doctrine.
So how did these weak and strong conceptions of stare decisis emerge in modern
discourse? This part answers this question by tracing back to their doctrinal roots the competing
39

Id. at 412.
See Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U.S. 376, 387 (1938) (overruling Gillespie).
41
See St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 93 (1936) (Stone, J., concurring); Connecticut
General Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 85 & n. 10 (1938); United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters
Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 579 (1944) (Stone, C.J., dissenting).
42
See National Mut. Ins. Co. of District of Columbia v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 618 n. 11 (1949)
(Rutledge, J., concurring).
40
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stare decisis tests advocated by Justices Kennedy and Stevens in Citizens United. This process of
doctrinal tracing is visually represented through a series of “opinion maps” that illustrate the
relationships between the competing opinions in the weak and strong stare decisis traditions. The
opinion maps initially confirm that both traditions share common ancestry in Brandeis’
Coronado Oil dissent. However, analysis of the doctrinal history also reveals that the stare
decisis debate in Citizens United effectively carries on an argument first engaged between Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thurgood Marshall in 1991’s Payne v. Tennessee. It is the debate
in Payne that provides the real blueprint for the Court’s modern dialectic of stare decisis
doctrine.
Citizens United currently stands as the latest major installment of the Court’s ongoing
argument over stare decisis. The stare decisis debate in the case stemmed from the majority’s
controversial decision to expand the First Amendment rights of corporations. To reach this
result, the majority had to overrule a 1990 precedent called Austin v. Michigan Chamber of
Commerce. 43 Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy concluded that overruling Austin was
justified after applying a weak stare decisis test. In dissent, Justice Stevens relied upon a strong
stare decisis test when he protested that the Court’s doctrine actually required adherence to
Austin. Since Kennedy and Stevens invoked competing opinions to establish their competing
tests, it makes sense to look back at those opinions, as well as the opinions they in turn relied on,
to uncover the roots of the dialectic between strong and weak schools.
Before applying this citation-tracing method to the stare decisis tests advocated by
Kennedy and Stevens in Citizens United, it bears emphasis that neither jurist used the adjectives
“weak” or “strong” to describe their competing tests. Rather, I have introduced these terms to
distinguish between conflicting doctrinal formulations of the proper inquiry the Court should use
when deciding whether to overrule one of its precedents. The weak test is so-called because it
effectively grants stare decisis less constraining power to prevent overruling than the so-called
strong test. Once again, I want to be clear that the actual doctrinal formulations do not use the
phrases like “constraining power.” Instead, as shown below, the linguistic difference turns on the
role of “reasoning” or “justification.”
Consider first the origins of the weak stare decisis test. Directly quoting 2009’s Montejo
v. Louisiana, Kennedy posited in his Citizens United majority opinion that the “relevant factors
in deciding whether to adhere to the principle of stare decisis include the antiquity of the
precedent, the reliance interests at stake, and of course, whether the decision was well
reasoned.” 44 (The emphasis on the soundness of the precedent case’s reasoning signals that
Kennedy is adopting the weak test.) As it happens, Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion in
Montejo – and he, in turn, relied on at least two earlier opinions to authorize this formulation of
the appropriate stare decisis test. Those earlier opinions again invoked prior cases, and so on.
This chain of opinions that effectively constitute the weak tradition is represented in Figure 1
below.
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See Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 913 (overruling Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652
(1990)). The Court notably also overruled another more recent precedent. See id. (overruling McConnell v. Federal
Election Com’n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003)).
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Id. at 912 (quoting Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S.Ct. 2079, 2088-89 (2009)) (emphasis supplied).
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Since this is the first opinion map presented, a brief introduction to the schema is in
order. Each triangle on the map represents a Court opinion; the case name appears above the
opinion and its author’s name appears below. The X-axis indicates the year the opinion case was
decided. The Y-axis shows the number of votes the opinion received on the Court – how many of
the Court’s nine Justices joined in the opinion. Under this schema, all points above the dashed
line are thus majority opinions. Solid arrows connecting opinions indicate that the latter opinion
directly cited the earlier one. The resulting picture is of continuous lines of authority that stand
for a particular proposition in Court discourse.
45

Figure 1
45

For a thorough discussion of the theory animating this doctrinal mapping schema, see Colin Starger, Exile on
Main Street: Competing Traditions and Due Process Dissent, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 1253 (2012); Colin Starger,
Expanding Stare Decisis: The Role of Precedent in the Unfolding Dialectic of Brady v. Maryland, 46 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. ___ (2013).
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Figure 1 represents the connections between opinions endorsing the proposition that
stare decisis permits overruling a precedent case that suffers from “bad reasoning.” While no
opinion in this tradition has ever precisely explained what constitutes a “well reasoned” or
“badly reasoned” decision, specific consideration of the challenged precedent’s quality of
reasoning is the distinctive characteristic of the weak stare decisis test. The map thus shows that
Kennedy’s assertion that a relevant factor in overruling is whether a precedent is “well reasoned”
traces all the way back to Brandeis’ Coronado Oil dissent. The exact chain of citation connects,
in reverse-chronological order, the following opinions: Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission (Justice Kennedy for the Court, 2010); 46 Montejo v. Louisiana (Justice Scalia for
the Court, 2009); 47 Pearson v. Callahan (Justice Alito for the Court, 2009); 48 Payne v. Tennessee
(Chief Justice Rehnquist for the Court, 1991); 49 Smith v. Allwright (Justice Reed for the Court,
1944); 50 and Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co. (Justice Brandeis dissenting, 1932). 51
Although the earliest opinion in Figure 1 is Coronado Oil, a further arrow extends back
to a star labeled “overruling proof.” This is intended to represent the proof set forth in the
footnotes of Brandeis’ famous dissent. As discussed in the previous part, these footnotes
definitively showed that – at least prior to 1932 – the Court had overruled its constitutional
precedents when dissatisfied with their underlying reasoning. The form and content of Brandeis’
proof exerted great influence over the subsequent discourse. In 1944, for example, Justice Reed
argued in Allwright that “when convinced of former error, this Court has never felt constrained to
follow precedent.” 52 To prove this proposition, Reed first cited to Brandeis’ footnotes and then
dropped his own footnote that documented a dozen new overrulings that had occurred since
1932. 53 Then in 1991, Chief Justice Rehnquist employed the same technique in Payne when he
carefully cataloged 33 constitutional decisions that had been overruled in the prior 20 years. 54
The empirical reality of the Court’s overruling practice thus stands as the ultimate backing for
the weak stare decisis tradition.
What about the competing strong tradition? To uncover the doctrinal origins of the strong
stare decisis tradition, it makes sense to once again start with Citizens United and work
backwards. In his Citizens United dissent, Stevens argued that stare decisis demands “significant
46

Citizens United v. Federal Election Com’n, 130 S.Ct. 876 (2010). Citizens United was a 5-4 decision. Justice
Kennedy wrote the majority opinion. Chief Justice Roberts wrote a separate concurrence, which was joined by
Justice Alito. Justice Stevens’ dissent received 4 votes.
47
Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778 (2009). Montejo was a 5-4 decision. Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion.
Justice Alito wrote a separate concurrence. Justice Stevens’ dissent received 4 votes.
48
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009). Pearson was a 9-0 decision. Justice Alito wrote the majority opinion.
49
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991). Payne was a 6-3 decision. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority
opinion. Justice Scalia wrote a separate concurrence that received three votes. Justice Marshall’s dissent received 3
votes.
50
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944). Allwright was a 8-1 decision. Justice Reed wrote the majority opinion
which received 7 votes. Justice Frankfurter concurred in result only. Justice Roberts wrote a solo dissent.
51
Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Coronado Oil was a 5-4 decision.
Justice McReynolds wrote the majority opinion. Justice Stone’s dissent received 4 votes. Justice Brandeis’ dissent
received 3 votes.
52
Allwright, 321 U.S. at 665.
53
Id. at 665, n. 10.
54
See Payne, 321 U.S. at 828, n. 1.
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justification beyond the preferences of five Justices [] for overruling settled doctrine.” 55 Directly
quoting 1992’s Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, Stevens elaborated that “a
decision to overrule should rest on some special reason over and above the belief that a prior
case was wrongly decided.” 56 Casey, of course, rejected a constitutional challenge to the right to
an abortion and adhered to Roe v. Wade primarily on stare decisis grounds. To support its view
that in absence of “special justification” stare decisis requires adherence to precedent, the joint
opinion in Casey inevitably cited earlier decisions.

Figure 2
Figure 2 represents the connections between opinions theoretically endorsing the strong
stare decisis proposition that overruling Court precedent is prohibited absent “special
justification.” At the outset, it is apparent that this map is more complicated than that presented
55
56

Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 938 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 938 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 864 (1992)).
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in Figure 1.This reflects the rather complex origins of the “special justification” formulation of
the stare decisis test. To understand the map’s depiction of this origin story, further explanation
is required. Note how the map uses both blue and red triangles to depict opinions. The blue
triangles point upward to indicate that they are opinions that affirmed a challenged precedent
case (or, if written in dissent, advocated affirming the precedent). By contrast, the red triangles
point downward to indicate that they are opinions that overruled a challenged precedent (or
advocated overruling). 57 Thus, although the chain of citation extends from Stevens’ dissent in
Citizens United back to Brandeis’ dissent in Coronado Oil, the map shows that Justice
O’Connor’s 1984 opinion in Rumsey is actually the earliest opinion in the strong stare decisis
tradition that adhered to a challenged precedent.
This reveals a key difference between the strong and weak traditions. While all the
opinions in the weak stare decisis line ultimately advocated overruling a challenged precedent,
all of the opinions in the strong stare decisis line were not similarly uniform in advocating
adherence to a challenged precedent. Before exploring this apparent contradiction, a formal
listing of the opinions in Figure 2 is in order. In reverse chronological order, they are: Citizens
United (Justice Stevens dissenting, 2010); 58 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey
(Joint plurality opinion by O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, 1992); 59 Payne (Justice Marshall
dissenting, 1991); 60 Rumsey v. Arizona (Justice O’Connor for the Court, 1984); 61 Swift & Co. v.
Wickham (Justice Harlan for the Court, 1965); 62 Allwright (Justice Reed for the Court, 1944); 63
and Coronado Oil (Justice Brandeis dissenting, 1932). 64
As noted, the apparent contradiction presented by Figure 2 is that strong stare decisis
tradition traces its origins to three opinions that did not advocate adhering to precedent –
Wickham, Allwright, and Coronado Oil. This contradiction is not all together surprising given the
tensions in Brandeis’ foundational Coronado Oil dissent. Though the dissent clearly bowed to
the force of better reasoning in constitutional decision-making, Brandeis also famously described
stare decisis as the default wise policy because “in most matters, it is more important that the
applicable law be settled than that it be settled right.”
On its own, this aphorism is not inconsistent with the strong stare decisis notion that a
decision to overrule should rest on more than “the belief that a prior case was wrongly decided.”

57
This second map also introduces dotted arrows to connect opinions despite the lack of a formal citation
relationship. I use dotted arrows to assert that the opinions are nonetheless connected and form part of the same
tradition. Specific justifications for these dotted arrows are provided below when discussing the particular opinions.
58
See supra note 46.
59
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). Casey was a 5-4 decision. No single
opinion commanded a majority. Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter authority a joint plurality opinion. Justices
Stevens and Blackmun wrote separate solo opinions concurring in part. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia
both wrote dissents that each received four votes.
60
See supra note 49.
61
Rumsey v. Arizona, 467 U.S. 203 (1984). Rumsey was a 7-2 decision. Justice O’Connor wrote the majority
opinion. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote a dissent that received two votes.
62
Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111 (1965). Wickham was a 6-3 decision. Justice Harlan wrote the majority
opinion. Justice Douglas dissented and his opinion received 3 votes.
63
See supra note 50.
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See supra note 51.
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Figure 2 represents the connection between this aspect of Coronado Oil and the strong stare
decisis tradition by extending an arrow back from the dissent to a star labeled “Better Settled.”
Clearly, Brandeis’s polite nod to the wisdom of stare decisis does not adequately explain
the origins of the strong tradition embraced by Stevens in Citizens United. A more complete
explanation requires a closer analysis of the doctrine. The focus should be etymological. This is
because one hallmark phrase is repeated enough in the doctrine that it fairly stands as shorthand
for the entire strong stare decisis tradition – “special justification.” In the roots of this phrase lie
the origins of the strong tradition’s most consistent theme.
The basic etymological inquiry is simple enough. As scholars have previously
acknowledged, Justice O’Connor introduced the phrase “special justification” into Court
discourse in 1984’s Rumsey. 65 Writing for the majority, O’Connor’s opinion had granted relief to
a criminal defendant via a relatively straightforward application of a 1981 double-jeopardy
precedent. Seeking to avoid this result, the State of Arizona had in its briefing urged the Court to
overrule the precedent. In response, O’Connor wrote: “We decline the invitation. Although
adherence to precedent is not rigidly required in constitutional cases, any departure from the
doctrine of stare decisis demands special justification.” 66
This simple sentence is the sole source of the Court’s current special justification
language, but it provoked no stare decisis debate at the time. Indeed, the phrase did not assume
any real significance in the discourse until the doctrine-defining debate between Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Marshall eight years later in Payne. It was really Marshall’s dissent in
Payne that provided the first unambiguous articulation of the strong stare decisis test. A review
of O’Connor’s citations in Rumsey confirms that the earlier doctrine essentially adopted a weak
stare decisis perspective.
For her “special justification” proposition, O’Connor directly cited two cases – Wickham
and Allwright. As noted, both of those cases overruled rather than affirmed prior precedent. Yet
O’Connor apparently relied on language in, rather than the results of, these decisions to support
the special justification proposition. In Wickham, the Court overruled a three-year-old precedent
penned by Justice Frankfurter. Only tacitly admitting the stare decisis implications of this move,
Harlan wrote in his majority opinion:
The overruling of a six-to-two decision of such recent vintage, which was
concurred in by two members of the majority in the present case and the opinion
in support of which was written by an acknowledged expert in the field of federal
jurisdiction, demands full explication of our reasons. 67
Harlan then explicated his reasons – since it had been decided, the challenged precedent had
sown confusion in the lower courts and proved unworkable. Though the unworkability of a
65

See Emery G. Lee III, Overruling Rhetoric: The Court’s New Approach to Stare Decisis in Constitutional Cases,
33 U. TOL. L. REV. 581 (2001) (noting origin of “special justification” in Rumsey).
66
Rumsey, 467 U.S. at 212.
67
Wickham, 383 U.S. at 116 (overruling Kesler v. Dep’t of Public Safety, 369 U.S. 153 (1962)) (internal footnotes
and citations omitted).
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precedent certainly counts as a special justification for overruling under current doctrine, it bears
emphasis that Harlan did not frame his Wickham discussion as a general reflection on stare
decisis. Instead, his “full explication of our reasons” phrase was inextricably linked to the
enormity of overruling a three-year-old Frankfurter opinion.
O’Connor’s “special justification” formulation is even more tenuously supported by her
citation to Allwright. Decided in 1944, Allwright held that the Fifteenth Amendment prohibited
racial discrimination in primary elections of political parties, thereby overruling a unanimous
1935 precedent that had permitted such discrimination. The only language in Justice Reed’s
majority opinion that even arguably promoted stare decisis was this: “In reaching this
[overruling] conclusion, we are not unmindful of the desirability of continuity of decision in
constitutional questions.” 68 However, Reed then strenuously insisted on the propriety of
overruling precedent when convinced of former error. This discussion more squarely locates
Allwright in the weak stare decisis tradition – an orientation confirmed by Allwright’s depiction
in Figure 1 above. Given this, O’Connor’s citation to Allwright is indeed puzzling – perhaps she
regarded the correction of a rank racial injustice as exemplifying a special justification.
In any event, it is clear that neither Wickham nor Allwright support a strong view of stare
decisis. This mattered little at the time since Rumsey did not provoke a stare decisis debate.
O’Connor’s argument for adhering to precedent was not challenged abstractly. The reality is that
in Rumsey, she did not use the phrase “special justification” in a rhetorically or doctrinally
significant sense. The phrase only assumed such significance in Payne. Because of its centrality
to the modern dialectic, Payne deserves a more detailed analysis.
The specific legal controversy in Payne turned on whether the Eighth Amendment
permitted jury consideration of victim impact evidence. Previous majorities had prohibited
victim impact evidence in cases called Booth and Gathers. Writing for a six-justice majority,
Rehnquist overruled these cases. In so doing, the Chief Justice advanced two critical propositions
about stare decisis doctrine. First, he argued that “considerations in favor of stare decisis are at
their acme in cases involving property and contract rights where reliance interests are involved”
and that “the opposite is true in cases such as the present one involving procedural and
evidentiary rules.” 69 Second, Rehnquist suggested that Booth and Gathers were ripe for
overruling because they had been “decided by the narrowest of margins, over spirited dissents
challenging the basic underpinnings of those decisions.” 70
In dissent, Justice Marshall loudly objected to Rehnquist’s articulation of the stare decisis
inquiry. Marshall specifically accused Rehnquist of creating a “radical new exception to the
doctrine of stare decisis” by suggesting that the Court could freely “discard any principle of
constitutional liberty which was recognized or reaffirmed over the dissenting votes of four
Justices and with which five or more Justices now disagree.” 71 Rejecting Rehnquist’s weak test,
Marshall posited that
68

Allwright, 321 U.S. at 665 (overruling Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935)).
See Payne, 501 U.S. at 828.
70
Id. at 829 (overruling Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987) and South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805
(1989)).
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Id. at 845 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
69
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[t]he overruling of one of this Court’s precedents ought to be a matter of great
moment and consequence… Consequently, this Court has never departed from
precedent without ‘special justification.’ 72
For this last proposition, Marshall naturally quoted Rumsey.
Marshall then elaborated on what he believed constituted special justifications. In the
main, legitimate justifications were major factual or legal developments that undermined a
challenged precedent’s essential rationale. Turning to the precedents at hand, Marshall argued
that no legal or factual developments justified overruling Booth and Gathers. He boldly
suggested that the only change of note since those cases were handed down was in the Court’s
own personnel. Rather than provide the special justification required by stare decisis, this new
majority had simply – and illegitimately – elevated the dissents from Booth and Gathers into the
law of the land.
The razor-sharp vehemence of Marshall’s dissent attracted the attention of the other
justices. In his separate concurrence, Justice Scalia suggested that Marshall acted hypocritically
by “demand[ing] of us some ‘special justification.’” 73 Justice Souter, who also concurred, took a
less personal tack and argued that the Court did indeed possess “special justification” for
overruling Booth and Gathers. 74 The substantive merits of these competing claims are not
relevant for this inquiry. What is relevant is that “special justification” suddenly took center
stage. Although the phrase had only been politely echoed in two cases since Rumsey, it now
became the linguistic axis around which the stare decisis debate turned. 75 And it has played a
lead role in the discourse ever since.
While this etymological account helps explain the original split between strong and weak
stare decisis traditions, the doctrinal history is not yet complete. Grasping the full rhetorical
context requires one final look at Marshall’s Payne dissent. Confronting Rehnquist’s proposition
that that stare decisis better protects “cases involving property and contract rights,” Marshall
warned that majority was “send[ing] a clear signal that essentially all decisions implementing the
personal liberties protected by the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment are open to
reexamination.” 76 Furthermore, he argued that
[t]aking into account the majority’s additional criterion for overruling – that a
case was decided or reaffirmed by a 5-4 margin “over spirited dissents” – the
continued vitality of literally scores of decisions must be understood now to
depend on nothing more than the proclivities of the individuals who now
comprise a majority of this Court. 77
72
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To dramatize this charge, Marshall proposed a specific list of “endangered precedents” that he
suggested might soon be overruled.
The endangered precedents identified by Marshall were all liberal constitutional decisions
potentially threatened by the new conservative majority. Marshall presciently included on his list
three cases that the Rehnquist Court did in fact overrule within the decade after Payne. 78 The
most prominent decision on his list, however, has so far survived all overruling challenges – Roe
v. Wade. Though it remains good law, Marshall’s concern for Roe under a weak stare decisis
framework was well warranted at the time. After all, Marshall retired from the Court months
after Payne and a Republican president (George Bush) appointed a conservative successor
(Clarence Thomas). And in the Term immediately following Payne, the Court in fact entertained
a very serious challenge to Roe. As it happens, the debate in Payne effectively anticipated –
perhaps even consciously – the epic stare decisis confrontation in 1992’s Casey.
In Casey, the Court reviewed the constitutionality of Pennsylvania laws restricting
abortion. Although the Court was explicitly invited to overrule Roe v. Wade, a majority of the
Court declined to do so. The majority opinion in Casey probably represents the zenith of the
strong stare decisis tradition. This is because the opinion’s joint authors (O’Connor, Kennedy,
and Souter) explicitly argued that “the force of stare decisis” compelled them to accept Roe
despite “the weight of the arguments” for its overruling and even their own “reservations” in
reaffirming its central holding. 79 In other words, the majority hinted that Roe might be “wrong”
but argued that stare decisis compelled them to affirm it anyway. Given that Roe is also the
Court’s most persistently controversial constitutional precedent, the significance of the
majority’s strong stare decisis stance cannot be overstated.
At the same time, significance should not be confused with originality. The majority in
Casey essentially advocated the same strong view of stare decisis that Marshall had championed
in Payne. Casey’s now-famous test looked to “a series of prudential and pragmatic
considerations” to decide whether overruling a precedent was appropriate that included the
precedent’s workability, reliance interests, related doctrinal development, and changed factual
circumstances. 80 This built upon Marshall’s stare decisis considerations and relied on much of
the same “precedent about precedent” – including Rumsey – that Marshall had invoked. And yet,
the Casey joint authors noticeably failed to cite Marshall’s dissent in their opinion. (To reflect
this absence of a formal citation relationship, the arrow pointing from Casey to Payne in Figure
2 is dotted).
This failure-to-cite on the part of the Casey majority should not obscure the fact that
Marshall’s dissent in Payne effectively ushered in a doctrinally distinct strong stare decisis test.
Building on Rumsey, Marshall’s Payne dissent had dubbed certain considerations as properly
part of an overruling inquiry. The Casey majority further developed these same considerations.
And like Marshall, the Casey majority did not include the “bad reasoning” of a precedent case as
78

See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (overruling Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985)); Adarand
Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (overruling Metro Broadcasting v. F.C.C., 497 U.S. 547 (1990)); United
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a relevant stare decisis consideration. Given that Marshall’s Payne dissent also loudly signaled
stare decisis as an important doctrine to protect particular liberal precedents targeted for
overruling – Roe chief among them – it seems evident that the Casey majority very much picked
up where Marshall left off.
On the flip side of the dialectic, the Casey dissenters also clearly followed the example
set by the Payne majority. In his Casey dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist thus proclaimed that
“authentic principles of stare decisis” require the Court “to bow to the lessons of experience and
the force of better reasoning.” 81 Although he did not repeat his claim from Payne that
constitutional precedents have less stare decisis value when reached over “spirited dissents,”
Rehnquist’s own spirited dissent in Casey quite obviously embraced the proposition. Meanwhile,
Justice Scalia’s separate Casey dissent echoed similar core themes. After noting that the joint
opinion failed to “squarely contend” that Roe was a correct application of “reasoned judgment,”
Scalia suggested that a legitimate stare decisis inquiry would ask, “How wrong was the
[original] decision on its face?” 82
After Payne then, the blueprint for the modern stare decisis dialectic was in place. Strong
and weak schools split over whether “authentic principles” of stare decisis properly looked to the
“correctness” of a precedent’s reasoning in overruling situations. Put another way, the split
concerned whether the strength of a prior dissent properly factored into decisions to adhere to a
challenged precedent. This split emerged in Payne and continued to play out in Court discourse
from Casey to Citizens United.

81
82
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Figure 3
Figure 3 combines Figures 1-2 and to provide a visual summary of the analysis in this
part. It bears emphasis, however, that Figure 3 does not purport to represent every opinion in the
dialectic of stare decisis doctrine. The map is not the territory. Complete accounts of both the
weak and strong stare decisis traditions would undoubtedly include other opinions. 83 However,
the point of the map is not exhaustive detail. Rather, the idea is to represent the most influential
and important opinions in the ancestry of the stare decisis debate in Citizens United. To deploy
an analogy, Figure 3 is like a constellation map. From a sparkling universe of opinions, it draws
83
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lines between the brightest stars in the dialectic. As has been shown, the brightest stars in stare
decisis doctrine are Justice Brandeis’ Coronado Oil dissent and the competing majority and
dissenting opinions in Payne.
III – The Precedential Value of Stare Decisis Doctrine
With the origins of the strong and weak stare decisis traditions now mapped, this part
critically examines the competing claims in the contemporary stare decisis dialectic.
Specifically, this part confronts the question – is either side “right” about what the doctrine of
stare decisis really requires?
Given that the Court itself ultimately defines the requirements of stare decisis doctrine,
the most literal answer to this question is “no.” As shown in the previous part, the Court does not
speak with one voice on this doctrine. Debate rages on and outcomes are mixed. Since Payne
initiated the modern dialectic, both traditions have won victories and suffered losses. Some
controversial precedents have been affirmed (like Roe in Casey) while others have been
overruled (like Austin in Citizens United). In this sense, stare decisis is like Due Process, Equal
Protection, or any other endlessly contested Court doctrine – inherently subjective and utterly
immune to “right” interpretation.
However accurate this answer may be as a descriptive matter, it utterly fails to satisfy any
normative yearnings. To scratch the normative itch, some judgment – even an imperfect one – is
required. Here, judgment is called for on the central question that apparently divides the weak
from strong approaches – the degree to which the soundness of a challenged precedent’s
reasoning is properly part of the stare decisis calculus. Of course, pinning down the precise
disagreement between the competing traditions on this question is tricky since neither side
speaks in absolutes. Both traditions pay lip service to adhering to precedent when necessary and
to overruling precedent when justified. There is ambiguity in how the dueling stare decisis
traditions understand “justification” and its relationship to the “reasoning” of precedent
decisions.
Given this ambiguity, it makes sense to reframe the inquiry. A useful alternate framework
for judgment concerns the competing attitudes toward the reasoning in dissents. After all, the
weak stare decisis tradition generally has had no compunction about citing the dissents
associated with challenged precedents and frankly adopting the dissent view of the argument
when overruling. On the other hand, opinions in the strong stare decisis line have loudly decried
the invocation of prior dissents as an illegitimate move incompatible with the rule of law. The
competing sides thus seem to have staked out clear and conflicting positions on whether the
force of a dissent’s reasoning should be given real weight when faced with an overruling
decision. The question thus remains: Who has the better argument?
At the outset, the weak tradition’s approach of admitting the force of prior dissents’
reasoning into the stare decisis calculus seems the presumptive victor. This is because Justice
Brandeis clearly embraced this position in Coronado Oil. Since Brandeis effectively transformed
stare decisis from a common-law maxim into Court doctrine, his word on the doctrine’s content
21

demands special deference. Of course, Brandeis did acknowledge – as all inheritors of the weak
stare decisis tradition do – that sometimes the law is better settled than settled right. Yet
Brandeis notably did not object to later overruling a precedent based on the analysis in a prior
dissent. After all, Brandeis was a famously successful dissenter and the force of reasoning in his
dissents – Coronado Oil not the least among them – helped change many areas of Court doctrine
for the better.
In order t o overcome Brandeis’ presumptive authority then, a pointed response to his
dissent-embracing analysis is needed. Perhaps the best response here appeals to consistency as a
means to preserve Court legitimacy. Though still invoked by the strong tradition, this argument
has noble roots that pre-date Brandeis. Consider Smith v. Turner, a case decided in 1849. In the
reported argument, counsel for one side asserted that his opponent could only win if the Court
overruled an 1832 precedent called Miln. In the course of his argument for stare decisis, he
observed:
This court remains, but its members change. Three of the five members who
decided in favor of State rights in the case of Miln are gone. Where is Thompson?
Where is Baldwin? Where is Barbour, who gave the opinion of the court in that
case? Had these judges remained in the seats which they once adorned, this suit
would never have been brought. Is it wise thus to invite speculation upon the sad
changes which the inevitable doom that awaits us all must produce in this
tribunal? If temporary majorities are to give the law of this court, its decisions,
which should be as permanent as the republic, will become as fluctuating and
mortal as its members. 84
The idea that Court precedent should not change with every new majority has intuitive appeal.
Constitutional law should have more consistency than politics. As Justice Brewer succinctly put
it in 1893, “A change in the personnel of a court should not mean a shift in the law.” 85
Though advocates for the weak stare decisis tradition would likely agree with Brewer, his
observation nonetheless presents a real challenge to Chief Justice Rehnquist’s Payne argument
that assigned less stare decisis value to precedents obtained by “narrowest of margins, over
spirited dissents.” By definition, 5-4 decisions are most vulnerable to changes in Court
personnel. And new lineups can all-too-easily look to prior dissents to find “better reasoning” to
rationalize a change in law actually motivated by ideology.
Major opinions in the weak stare decisis tradition can be plausibly interpreted as
ideological overrulings made possible by change in the composition of the Court. In Citizens
United, for example, Justice Stevens persuasively argued that the majority overruled Austin
simply because it did not “like” Austin and characterized Justice Kennedy’s majority’s opinion
84
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as “essentially an amalgamation of resuscitated dissents.” 86 In fact, Justice Kennedy in Citizens
United did favorably cite his very own dissent from Austin and did adopt its reasoning while
make his case for overruling. 87 Similarly, Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Montejo overruled
Michigan v. Jackson while citing to Chief Justice Rehnquist’s prior Jackson dissent. 88 Finally,
Rehnquist in Payne justified overruling Booth by directly invoking Justice White’s Booth
dissent. 89 In all of these cases, a new court lineup looked to prior dissents to rationalize
overruling liberal precedents.
Despite this, it would be a mistake to regard the weak stare decisis tradition as a ruse
perpetrated by a conservative Court majority. While the post-Payne dialectic has frequently seen
the members of the Court’s liberal wing appeal to stare decisis to defend older liberal precedents,
the pattern is not monolithic. Over time, liberal justices have also frequently advocated
overruling based on prior dissents. Indeed, there is a flip-side to the empirical reality of
overruling first demonstrated by Brandeis – changes in the composition of the Court have
definitely facilitated overruling and justices of all political stripes have taken advantage of this
reality.
More than this, individual justices have often taken inconsistent positions on stare decisis
doctrine. In Payne, for example, Justice Scalia observed that the “response to Justice Marshall’s
strenuous defense of the virtues of stare decisis can be found in the writings of Justice Marshall
himself.” 90 Scalia quoted Marshall’s prior observation that stare decisis “is not an imprisonment
of reason” and concluded that Marshall really agreed with the proposition that precedents “with
plainly inadequate rational support” should be overruled. 91 In essence, Scalia charged Marshall
with adopting the weak approach when he disapproved of the precedent in question and the
strong approach when he approved. Meanwhile, though Chief Justice Rehnquist articulated a
weak test in Payne, he later took a surprisingly strong stance toward stare decisis in Dickerson v.
United States – a case that affirmed the notably liberal precedent Miranda v. Arizona. 92 When
Justice Scalia dissented from this stare decisis analysis in Dickerson, Rehnquist subtly pointed to
Scalia’s own inconsistency by quoting his observation that the fact that a rule has found “wide
acceptance in the legal culture... is adequate reason not to overrule it.” 93
Such examples of inconsistency could be multiplied. However, the basic point is brought
home by the fact that Justice Kennedy both wrote the Citizens United majority opinion and was
one of the joint opinion authors in Casey. He has thus advocated for and against including an
analysis of a challenged precedent’s reasoning in the stare decisis calculus. In other words, the
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Court’s most prominent swing vote has swung wildly on the question of what authentic
principles of stare decisis really require.
The widespread inconsistency of justices towards the proper stare decisis test suggests
that the Court’s “precedent about precedent” itself has little precedential value. From one case to
the next, a single justice may analyze overruling questions using different stare decisis tests.
Whether the test advocated is weak or strong depends entirely on the result being justified.
Strong stare decisis tests –disavowing inquiry into the reasoning of a challenged precedent –
only ever appear in opinions urging adherence. On the flip side, weak tests that emphasize the
force of reasoning in prior dissents only show up in opinions pushing for overruling.
Choosing sides in the debate over stare decisis doctrine is thus ill-advised. Consistency
about stare decisis doctrine may sounds like a good rule-of-law idea, but its theoretical value is
challenged by the practical bottom line of strong versus weak views of stare decisis. When all is
said and done, a weak view of stare decisis authorizes change in doctrine through overruling
precedent while a strong view promotes stability by affirming precedent. It seems unfair (if not
absurd) to expect any jurist to universally commit ahead of time to always supporting doctrinal
change or always supporting doctrinal stability. Sometimes change is good. Sometimes stability
is. Context matters immensely.
In the final analysis, stare decisis doctrine is all about context. It is a way of arguing
about context – a rhetorical mode for debating first-order Court doctrine. i The competing
opinions in the stare decisis dialectic effectively provide a list of ready-made arguments for and
against overruling any given precedent. Justices frame their own particular cases for overruling
or adhering to precedent by citing to earlier stare decisis discussions. These earlier discussions
themselves cite back to even earlier opinions – and so on, in a chain, all the way back to
Brandeis’ dissent in Coronado Oil. Yet no opinion in the chain can ever stand completely apart
from the particular overruling debate that precipitated it.

i

Aristotle’s term for this kind of rhetorical mode was topoi – topics of invention. See generally ARISTOTLE, ON
RHETORIC: A THEORY OF CIVIL DISCOURSE (George A. Kennedy trans., 2d ed. 2007).
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